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1. Where does justice find its beginning? From what place can we begin to think that which is
just? Approaching this question requires a renouncement. A renouncement directed not towards the
urge of answering the question, but towards answering the question in the form it is being asked.
Finding the right answer, or rather, finding the just answer to this question requires renouncing the
order of the static opposition of question and answer structuring this very question. It requires hol-
lowing out the ground on which any such order could be founded and sinking into its foundation
until one’s feet appear beneath the soil, launching the thinking body into the abyss of the true ques-
tion. There is no beginning to justice, if we are to think of this beginning as the fundamental opposi-
tion to an end, a calculable, foreseeable conclusion. There is a beginning to justice only if we think
this beginning as being caught up in a motion which has already long announced its end, which has
already built the cradle for a new beginning. We here have to spin the order of beginning and end in
a ceaseless motion, as if tossing a coin into the air, suspending it there, making head in-differenti-
able from tail, bottom from top, life from death.
2. The question of justice in Western philosophy finds one instantiation in precisely this interplay
of life and death. I am referring here to Plato’s Apology. The Apology is not only a text tracing the
fate of the great philosopher Socrates by recounting his final speech before the judges of Athens,
but it is also a text that,  between the lines,  announces the advent of a promising justice that is
birthed from death, or, to be more precise, from a specific kind of death. Socrates, as I will argue,
evokes a justice that does not surge from the defence of one’s determination as a singular accused,
or from the reconciliation of the criminal singularity into the ethical social body through pardon or
punishment, but which rather derives from a radical negation, a radical annihilation of the category
of pure singularity. Socrates does not defend himself as an accused who is determinately and defin-
itively singular, which also means a quantifiable, substantial being, but rather affirms the fact that,
in some sense, there is no such singular to be defended, that he is not even one (οὐδείς), less than
one, nothing. It is, precisely, in this affirmation of a negative, in this widening of a chasm, that a
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radically other conception of justice and its relation to the singular is opened up. By pushing the de-
termination of what is or can be considered singular to the margins of its possibility, by challenging,
bending, pushing the question of the singular and its defence to its outmost limit, Socrates redeploys
justice not as a remedying balance, but as the abysmal economy of the bottomless question, a fall
into the void, in which the singular can never be without reference to an outside, and, in which the
singular is so radically singular, that the only way to treat it justly is to grant it the status of an un -
graspable, uncoupled and uncategorizable thing. In gradually shedding off the substantial presup-
positions of his singularity as an individual (knowledge, self-relation and relation to others), he un-
leashes a conception of the singular which, beyond the individual self, takes on ontological weight
and becomes conceptually tied to a kind of justice, a wholly other justice, which has shaken the tra-
dition ever since, and, as we shall see, reverberates again in what Jacques Derrida called  decon-
struction. The purpose of this study, to be very clear, will not be to offer a complete account of what
the Apology represents in relation to the other works of Plato, nor will it pretend to stand as a defin-
itive and historically accurate scholarly interpretation of this text, of Socrates as a person, or of the
Athenian justice system. Rather, it will invite to speculate, perhaps in a more experimental manner,
on the themes Socrates’ speech evokes by reconsidering them with regard to Jacques Derrida’s
thought. We will thus allow ourselves to suspend certain hermeneutic grounds, and to focus entirely
on the textual mechanisms, the interplay of themes and concepts it alludes to and names, in order to
see how this text portrays a perhaps unfamiliar, uniquely singular, Socrates, and to bring to light
how his defence recalls the deconstructive question of justice.
Abysmal Singularity
3. Let us begin our study of the relation between the singular and justice in the Apology by con-
sidering how Socrates, as the accused singular subject among a larger body of individuals, slowly
deconstructs the epistemological notion that one can pin down, determine and neatly categorise a
subject as a singular entity1 to be weighed against a universality, such as a claim to justice, and how,
in so doing, the notion of singularity begins to shift its meanings. The question of justice with refer-
ence to both Socrates and Derrida will be deployed in full effect in the following chapter.
1 Terms such as the singular, the self, and the subject will be used interchangeably since they are intimately tied, in
this first part of our study, to the notion of singularity referring to a quantifiable, identifiable, single substance. This,
in itself, begs a lot of questions, which, in the confines of this study, cannot all be addressed. Yet, the aporetic diffi-
culties to clearly differentiate these terms also renders explicit the way in which the singular is caught between its
multiple determinations, and its unique status as a category beyond categorisation.
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4. Socrates is sure of one thing, namely that his appearance before the judges, and his defence
against the threefold accusation of worshipping lesser gods, corrupting the youth and reversing the
order of truth, stands for a kind of justice: “I am confident in the justice of my cause” (Apology
17c).2 This is no simple acknowledgement of the fact that he is appearing before a court of law, that
he has to defend himself as an accused individual who has disturbed the legal order of his city, but
rather a very specific introduction to an argumentative speech seeking to subvert the way in which
the question of justice is usually understood. The “matter of justice” that is here in question speaks a
language, a dialectical, philosophical language, which speaks of justice in a manner which seems
ineffable to his accusers. So he says:
If I defend myself in my accustomed manner, […] I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to
interrupt me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first
time before a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language of the place; and therefore I would
have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native
tongue, and after the fashion of his country. (17d-18a)
5. What is truly significant about this passage, is that Socrates exposes that his manner of speak-
ing and his way of addressing justice, are, in a certain manner, lacking. They do not enter the con-
ventional discursive economy in which a singular accused affirms himself before the law, but rather
misses this mark entirely. We here don’t see the defence of a criminal who assumes his position in
the dialectic between accusation and defence; we see, from the start, the admission of a deficiency
that, in a way, keeps Socrates from entering this very dialectic. In fact, Socrates’ language lacks the
epistemological foundation to fully grasp the matter at hand. To put it differently, he makes himself
appear not as an accused, the role the court expects of him, but as someone who does not know how
to defend himself against an accusation, or how to speak of justice, at least not as it is commonly
understood by those who accuse him. He explicitly says that he has to resort to his own language,
the language of a stranger, of an outsider to the domain of the law, in order to present his defence.
The topic of justice, the defence of the singular, is, therefore, introduced by passing through the
avowal of a gaping non-knowledge at the heart of the speaking subject.3 This is not a mischievous
act seeking to hide or conceal a truth, since Socrates feels obliged to speak “the whole truth” (17b).
Yet, it is, at the same time, also not an account that seeks to be truthful by simply offering a list of
2 Subsequent references to the text will follow the Stephanus pagination. Edition used: “Apology”. The Dialogues of
Plato Vol. 1. Ed. and Transl. by Benjamin Jowett. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 341-66.
3 It is to be noted that Socrates, of course, is not entirely ignorant about Athen’s justice system, as also becomes clear
later in the Apology (32b to 32d). However, what is of interest here is that the way he presents himself breaks the cy-
clical motion of accusation, defense, and delivery of justice. His non-compliance is, in itself, the interruption of this
cycle and that which allows him to bring into question the themes we are here seeking to discuss.
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factual properties pertaining to the speaker. The expression of truth, the authentic expression of the
singular on which all eyes are focused, is achieved by laying bare its limits, by exposing, in a sense,
what it lacks. Truth here is not the assertion of a fact or of a knowledge but rather the avowal that it
lies in its detour through a negation. To put it differently: through asserting a non-predicate, by af-
firming what he lacks, Socrates determines himself truly as himself, the revealer of that which he
cannot reveal. In this pre-Hegelian example of a “determinate negation”, the negative quality, the
lack, becomes the ‘content’ of the thing itself,4 the defining factor of the subject. In truth, we here
bear witness to a questioning of foundations. The singular sees that his presupposed ground, in this
case the knowledge of justice and of the self, is lacking, and that it is, precisely, that which is miss-
ing, this shortage, that is retroactively posited as the actual ‘ground’ of the subject.5 A ground that is,
in fact, not a ground but rather a gaping abyss, a nothing (οὐδείς). Whatever we might believe to be
the epistemological certainties grounded in our singular experience are here subtly laid out as phant-
asmic figurations that ultimately lead to a surprisingly empty void. Knowledge is introduced as
something expressible only as a lack; a lack from which the singular nevertheless derives.
6. And is this not the very teaching of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues? It is this Socratic as-
sumption, this knowledge of a non-knowledge, which also leads contemporary thinkers, like Gra-
ham Harman, to again stress that philosophy is not about the possession of knowledge at all, but
that it should rather aim for a more dynamic “love of wisdom”.6 This new kind of wisdom becomes
clear in Socrates’ defence against the following claim: “Socrates is an evil-doer; and a curious per-
son, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the bet-
ter cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrine to others” (19b-c). What this accusation states, is
that Socrates is reversing and perverting the order of question and answer and of attainable know-
ledge by undermining the assumptions and presuppositions at the heart of the claims to truth of his
4 Although it must be affirmed here that Hegel is critical of the Platonic or Socratic negative, as he writes quite clearly
in the Science of Logic: “[T]he Platonic dialectic, in the Parmenides itself and elsewhere even more directly, on the
one hand only has the aim of refuting limited assertions by internally dissolving them and, on the other hand, gener -
ally comes only to a negative result. Dialectic is commonly regarded as an external and negative activity which does
not belong to the fact itself but is rooted in mere conceit, in a subjective obsession for subverting and bringing to
naught everything firm and true, or at least as in resulting in nothing but the vanity of the subject matter subjected to
dialectical treatment.” Hegel, The Science of Logic, 34-35. That the ‘bringing to naught’, the voiding of the content,
which Hegel here abhors, could be worth pursuing, is what we are here trying to think and think through.
5 Slavoj  Žižek explains  this  dialectical  intricacy  in  his  explanation  of  ‘reconciliation’,  a  central  moment  of  the
Hegelian speculative dialectic: “…there is no substantial Being to which the subject can return, no encompassing
organic Order of Being in which the subject has to find its proper place.  ”Reconciliation” between subject and
substance means the acceptance of this radical lack of any firm foundational point: the subject is not its own origin,
it comes second, it is dependent upon its substantial presuppositions; but these presuppositions also do not have a
substantial consistency of their own but are always retroactively posited.” S. Žižek, Less than Nothing, 258-9. I
believe this point is radicalised beyond return in the Socratic variation of the dialectic.
6 G. Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology, 6.
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fellow citizens. Such is precisely the Socratic moment in all of Plato’s early dialogues: however
long the dialectic between Socrates and his interlocutors extends, the outcome remains the same. No
determinable, factual answer or definition is ever achieved, only new questions, an aporetic, murky
void, remain. However, this does not mean that nothing at all is gained. On the contrary, reversing
the order of question and answer, knowledge and truth, is precisely the upshot of Socrates’ method
of questioning and his self-negation before the jurors. The singular subject is reduced to an impotent
void, who is unable to formulate any positive epistemological statement on his own, but, like a
phoenix born from sacrifice, wisdom takes flight and sets the scene for a new understanding of the
singular and its epistemological engagement with the world.
7. To be very clear here, let us look at Socrates’ account of the riddle of the Gods of Delphi,
which was told to his friend Chaerephon and which states “that there [is] no man wiser” (21a) than
Socrates, to which Socrates expresses initial puzzlement, since he “know[s] that [he] ha[s] no wis-
dom, small or great” (21b). How can wisdom be linked to self-proclaimed ignorance? In a perhaps
strange sense, the answer is already formulated in the question. Socrates’ first reaction to the riddle,
harking back to his general renouncement of the notion that he himself could constitute a firm
enough foundation for a divine amount of wisdom, is that there has to be someone wiser than him,
and finding someone wiser than him would allow him to “go to the god with a refutation in [his]
hand” (21c). However, he finds no one who meets said requirements, since, from politicians to po-
ets,  all  the people he interrogates only have “pretensions to wisdom”(21d) while still  declaring
themselves wise. Socrates describes such an encounter:
Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better
off than he is,–for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know.
In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. (21d)
8. We can again discern Socrates’ clear exposition of his lack of knowledge, which is here refor-
mulated into a positive trait. Yet, Socrates makes it quite clear that this “advantage” is not at all
something that could be described as an access to a higher truth that is beyond the reach of his fel -
low Athenians, or that he was in possession of a knowledge so radically transcendent that the only
way to challenge him would be to get rid of him, as is the purpose of his trial. Quite paradoxically,
Socrates interprets the riddle of Delphi not as the Gods attributing a certain positive quality to him,
but rather as the assertion of a missing quality:
[M]y hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others. But the
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truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise;  and by his answer he intends to show that  the
wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; although speaking of Socrates, [the God of Delphi] is only
using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who like Socrates,
knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. (23a-b)
9. Socrates is not an accumulator of knowledge, but rather the frantic negative incessantly re-
nouncing the possibility of any such possession. And this because he sees that what others proudly
claim to be an ownership of knowledge, a foundation firmly rooted in and growing from the self-
identified sphere of the singular and its horizon of experience, is but a comic farce amusing the
Gods. A knowledge grasped by a singular subject is worth nothing, precisely because it reaches into
thin air: philosophical knowledge is dead at birth, it has no ground to call its own, but lingers in a
void, an abyss in which no roots can ever grasp the soil, carrying always with it the surplus of a
lack. Socrates is not, psychoanalytically speaking, the pervert claiming access to a higher truth, but
is rather the example of a mortal man modestly recognising the necessary groundless ground, as
well as the defining limits, of his position as a singular subject. It is here, in this recognition, where
true wisdom is revealed. This brings us back to the tautological question stated above. Socrates is
wise not because he knows everything, but, precisely, because he knows that he, in his enclosed sin-
gularity, cannot know at all. He is wise because he proclaims his own ignorance. He affirms his own
negation, determines himself as negative, and thus enters a new sphere of thinking in which the sin-
gular, wisdom, knowledge and justice are irredeemably ungrounded, set in motion into a bottomless
free-fall.7
10. It might be objected at this stage that the Apology can hardly be a text that seeks to undermine
the substantiality, the continuity, the ground of the singular subject and its epistemological matrix,
since the very point of the text is to document an individual’s defence of his own innocence pre-
cisely as an individual entity appearing before the law. Even more, it is a text exploring concepts
such as individual civic duty, the education of the members of society, and the subordination of the
singular to divine laws. However, what we are here trying to unravel is that Socrates seeks to situate
his own defence precisely within a logic in which such a fixed determination of what the singular is,
what it knows, and the differentiation between singular and whole, cease to be straightforwardly as-
7 The metaphor of the fall, and its emancipatory potential, has recently been brilliantly analysed by artist and theorist
Hito Steyerl, in her text “In Free Fall: A Thought Experiment on Vertical Perspective”, The Wretched of the Screen,
12-31. There are a number of parallels between this study and her text, most notably the move from the grounded
observer, which Steyerl identifies as posited in paintings structured by a vanishing point perspective, to the notion of
the falling perspective, which she sees exemplified in birds-eye-perspectives common in the age of GPS and aerial
travel. According to Steyerl, this change in perspective allows for a rethinking of the ground as an abysmal free-fall
that bears potential for new modes of thought, an idea to which this study is deeply indebted.
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sertible. What our reading so far has shown is precisely that there is, indeed, a continuous Socratic
subject, but that it is defined by an abysmal epistemological uncertainty which, precisely, clouds the
possibility  of  his  determination  as  a  singular  subject.  The  domain  of  the  singular  in  Socrates’
thought is hybrid and forever deferred, both singular and lacking the necessary ground to establish
this singularity, caught in a downward spiral from which it nevertheless acts and engages with the
world. It needs to ex-pose its own lack and dynamise itself in a dialectic with its fellow subjects
without ever being able to fully exhaust and replenish this lack. The surplus-lack always remains,
pushing it onwards to yet another epistemological or subjective determination, which will also inev-
itably turn out to be lacking. Socrates, in this manner, becomes the proponent of a thinking that
seeks the constant reactualisation of the self, not as a transparent, readily accessible substance, but
as an abysmal entity that is incessantly falling, spinning and in need of constant reorientation. And
herein lies, perhaps, a first reformulation of the singular from a fixed, identifiable substance to a
plastic, moldable and always uniquely changing singularity. The ‘continuous’ subject that is here as-
serted is one that passes through its own negation, through a radical questioning of its own category
and which does so without any hope of bringing this question to its definitive conclusion, hence al-
ways remaining in an original state of non-categorisation. Michel Foucault, in one of his interviews,
takes Socrates to be a voice of consciousness constantly pushing his fellow citizens towards assum-
ing this very question of the self:
Prenons l’example de Socrate: il est précisément celui qui interpelle les gens dans la rue, ou les jeunes
au gymnase, en leur disant : «Est-ce que tu t’occupes de toi?». Le dieu l’a chargé de cela, c’est sa
mission, et il ne l’abandonnera pas, même au moment où il est menacé de mort. Il est bien l’homme
qui se soucie du souci des autres : c’est la position particulière du philosophe.8
11. We can thus see here how Socrates assumes the position of the questioning negative who tries
to shove his fellow citizens back into the abyss of the ‘examined life’. Yet, what Foucault perhaps
misses, and this needs to be stressed absolutely, is that this Socratic questioning and caring for his
fellow citizens has to start with the auto-questioning of the self’s status as a singular substance. The
Socratic self, to establish itself as such, to reach the position to question others, always already has
to radically question itself, and this, as we shall now see, beyond just epistemological questions
about the world, but also by asking questions fundamentally related to the constitution of the singu-
8 [Let us look at the example of Socrates: he is, precisely, the one who calls out to the people in the street, or to the
young at the gymnasium, telling them: “Do you take care of yourself?”. God put him in charge of this, it is his
mission, and he will not abandon it, even when his life is threatened. He is very much the man who cares about the
care for the others: it is his particular position as a philosopher.] M. Foucault, Foucault: Dits et écrits, 1976-1988,
1534.
74
L’Atelier 12.1 (2020) Le Singulier
lar subject as such. This is not simply a matter of asking questions about knowledge, concepts, intu-
ition or other strictly philosophical categories, but rather an existential challenge, which amounts,
precisely, to Socrates’ challenge in this trial, a challenge which pushes the possibility of the singular
towards that which  singularly  announces the advent of its impossibility. The singular, in order to
touch upon the wisdom to understand its own constitution, has to face the most radical annihilation
conceivable: death. In fact, in the Apology, Socrates performs a defence of the constitutive force of
the act of facing mortality that could serve as a precursor to Hegel’s or Heidegger’s treatment of this
theme.9 Let us unravel this.
12. After having debunked Meletus’ charges of corrupting the youth and of worshipping false
gods, Socrates moves on to consider how the likely outcome of his trial, his death sentence, shall af-
fect him.  In a certain manner,  Socrates is  here not  afraid  of what awaits  him, since  death  has
already come knocking at his door: he is already dead in the eyes of his accusers. He explains that
what will ultimately lead to his demise isn’t Meletus’ or Anytus’ decision, but rather the fact that
general distrust in him that has led to this trial:
I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but I
know only too well how many are the enmities which I have incurred, and this is what will be my
destruction if I am destroyed; – not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world,
which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no
danger of my being the last of them. (28a-b)
13. Socrates’ teaching is reaching deaf ears, his voice is not being heard and his practice has led
the polis to consider him a criminal. He is not part of the life of Athens, but rather the illness threat-
ening to disturb its health and harmony. However, just as we have seen in his reversal of the fragil -
ity of epistemology into an affirmation of a new type of knowledge, namely wisdom, Socrates again
subverts the purely economical logic of public opinion and takes it from its understanding that life
ends in death and that death is the ultimate annihilation, to the wise expression that death equals a
form of life, a new birth. So he continues:
Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you
to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for
anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in
doing anything he is doing right or wrong – acting the part of a good man or of a bad. (28b)
9 For a reading of Hegel’s account on death, and how it precedes Heidegger’s, see J. Cohen, Le Sacrifice de Hegel, 45.
For a seminal reading of Heidegger’s being-towards-death see E. Levinas, “Mourir Pour…”, Entre Nous, 204-14.
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14. Leading a good life is here not equated with calculability, with choosing one thing over the
other, with safeguarding life from death; as if the sanctity of life could be achieved without a sacri-
fice. Doing right, the ultimate goal for Socrates, is intimately tied to the challenge of death, the
threat of the annihilation of life,  and finds its true expression precisely in passing through that
which destabilises it completely. It is in facing death, in considering the most radical abysmal des-
cent into the void, that Socrates here begins to rethink the practice of the philosopher, doing good,
and the expression of justice. And this not because in facing death we would somehow hold even
dearer onto life, but rather because it opens up the possibility of  rethinking  the modalities of the
good and of life, of rethinking justice, and of rethinking ourselves. In fact, what if death announced
an experience so radical that the foundation beneath the logic of the ‘either/or’, of substantial op-
position, was shaken to the point of its dissolution? Socrates explains:
For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretence of
knowing the unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the
greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance
which is the conceit that a man knows what he does not know? And in this respect only I believe
myself to differ from men in general, and may perhaps claim to be wiser than they are: – that whereas
I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and
disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid
a possible good rather than a certain evil. (29a-b)
15. Socrates is here, again, targeting an epistemological claim about an unknown. No one knows
death, has ever experienced it first hand, and still it is claimed to be the radical opposite of what is
desirable. Similarly, life, in opposition to this unknown, is established as the fundamental centri-
petal positive governing the negative determinations of everything that falls outside of its frame.
Again, Socrates shows that a lack of knowledge is not to be considered the ground for any such sub-
stantial claims, but should rather signal something like an abyss in which oppositional relationships
and the supposed substances making up this opposition need to be reconsidered. Life and death,
good and bad, are suspended, lifted from the clutches of the pretensions of knowledge and released
into the void of the unknown. In a certain sense, we here see the continuation of Socrates’ polemic
against the pretension of knowledge, and how this pretension governs the way in which concepts
are differentiated into sealed-off ontological considerations: knowledge means to know what things
are. But what if such reasoning is misled? What if the unknown, what if death, in its radical exclu-
sion from knowledge, began to destabilize the order of substantiality, of epistemology and of the
supposed good? What if these categories, in being defined as the opposite of an unknown, were
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transformed beyond return into something they never even presumed they could be?10 How are we
to define life within such a logic, if its opposite remains unclear? Instead of trying to solve this
problem by determining what death is in opposition to life, Socrates is rather questioning the oppos-
itional logic structuring these questions itself. He shows that in diving into the unknown, in not pre-
supposing death as standing in a definitive opposition to life, a new way of thinking becomes pos-
sible, in which the singular is no longer defined as living until its radical end, but rather as an entity
suspended within this new matrix, oscillating between life and death, constantly and incessantly
falling and swirling up and down, left and right, never planting its roots in any particular ground,
defined as undefinable. The experience of death, the act of facing death, is not an experience that
should create anxiety, leading one to hold onto life or even pretend to know about death, but which
rather radically shocks, alters and reconfigures the entire epistemological framework governing life
itself. And Socrates’ point here is subtle. It is important to stress that he is not following an Epicur-
ean line in this passage. He is not simply stating that we should not fear death because we cannot
know it, but rather that death serves as a reminder that what is unknown cannot serve as a firm
ground for definitive determinations. The unknown is not that which follows the known; rather, it is
the experience that an unknown is awaiting that completely troubles and shakes what we pretend to
know. If all life leads to death, if all life is born as radical finitude, if the unknown awaits those who
pretend to know, then the singular, the bearer of the experience of such an order, too, needs to be
seen as standing on a ground which will inevitably be ungrounded. Socrates pushes the singular to
the threshold of being and non-being and locates it not on one of both sides, but rather  simultan-
eously  on  neither. The singular becomes hybrid: living and dying, caught in a constant cycle of
death and resuscitation, in a mortifying logic which incessantly un-grounds its position. And, again,
this is not a terrible conclusion: it furnishes the unfinished ground which renders the singular as
such possible. Facing death is not the act of shivering in horror before the finitude or negation of the
singular subject, but rather the affirmation of the infinity of this singular finitude, the affirmation of
life not as a finite identity until death, but, precisely, as the freedom to constantly sacrifice and re-
suscitate oneself into yet another version of the self, to launch oneself yet again into the abyss and
reorient oneself in a transformative fall. We here see a similarity with Heidegger’s being-towards-
death and Dasein’s resoluteness [Entschlossenheit], the assumption of one’s ontological obligation
10 The fact that Socrates considers justice, the certainty that injustice is bad and our sense of ethics to be exempt from
this deconstructive experience of death as an unknown, as can be read from the passage just cited, will be commen-
ted on in the next chapter.
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towards finitude, which, as Yuk Hui explains quite well, is precisely the constitution of Dasein’s
freedom:
Such resoluteness […] is brought about by the recognition of being-towards-death as finitude and
limit of Dasein. In other words, being-towards-death is the necessary condition of any freedom in its
‘authentic sense’. Only in being free for death does Dasein understand its finite freedom, which allows
it to choose and to decide between accidental situations, and therefore become able to hand down to
itself its own fate.11
16. This freedom is, however, so radical here, that its logic spans, ontologically speaking, onto the
realm of the living and that of the dead. It is as if, in conducting his defence under the banner of be-
ing caught between life and death, Socrates opened the doors for a devouring modality which would
unravel and undo the very frame of thought which allowed him to be singularly accused as a finite
mortal  being and be threatened to be passed over into the realm of the dead. Bridging the gap
between living and dying, he shakes the margin separating the two sides, speaks of the dead, like
“Odysseus or Sisyphus” (41c) as if they were alive, and completely shatters the legal frame that
here seeks to reestablish the world of the living by transposing Socrates into an other-world, by,
quite literally, annihilating him, by making him disappear from the living world. In fact, what So-
crates here shows, is that the nihil is always already present in the ens, that the world is already an
other-world,  an  under-world, an  abysmal  world.12 In assuming death, in dislodging the singular
from its simple identity with life and in marking the traces of an other within itself, he un-grounds
the logic in which his sentence has any meaning at all; in a way, he here escapes his sentence by
marking its outcome, its punishment, as the already-given.
11 Y. Hui, The Question Concerning Technology in China, 232-33.
12 Jacques Derrida was attentive to this point. In his seminar “La peine de mort” he emphasises: “L’Apologie  le dit
expressément (24 b c): la kategoria, l’accusation lancée contre Socrate, c’est d’avoir eu le tort, d’avoir été coupable,
d’avoir commis l’injustice (adikein) de corrompre les jeunes gens et de (ou pour) avoir cessé d’honorer (nomizein)
les dieux (theous) de la cité ou les dieux honorés par la cité – et surtout de leur avoir substitué non pas simplement
de nouveaux dieux, comme disent souvent les traductions, mais de nouveaux démons (etera de daimonia kaina) ; et
daimonia, ce sont sans doute des dieux, des divinités, mais aussi parfois, comme chez Homère, des dieux inférieurs
ou des revenants, les âmes des morts ; et le texte distingue bien les dieux et les démons : Socrate n’a pas honoré les
dieux (theous) de la cité, et il a introduit des démons nouveaux (etera de daimonia kaina).” [The Apology says it
expressly (24 b c): the  kategoria, the accusation launched against Socrates, is to have been wrong, to have been
guilty,  to  have commited the injustice (adikein)  of  corrupting the  young and to (or  in  order  to)  have stopped
honouring (nomizein) the gods (theous) of the city or the gods honoured by the city – and, especially, to not only
have substituted them by new gods, as the translations sometimes say, but by new demons (etera de daimonia
kaina);  and  daimonia are,  without a  doubt,  gods,  divinities,  but  also sometimes, as in Homer,  inferior  gods or
revenants, the souls of the dead; and the text very much distinguishes between gods and demons: Socrates did not
honour the gods (theous) of the city, and he introduced new demons (etera daimonia kaina).] J. Derrida, Séminaire
La peine de mort, 27-8. Socrates, during his defence, has introduced the netherworld into the world of the living, has
breached the limit between what is alive and what is dead.
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17. Yet, and this is important, Socrates is here not simply asserting himself as a form of immortal
subject. Earlier on, we have seen how he specifically renounces the possibility of possessing any di-
vine quality, or anything that would make him, factually, superior to his fellow Athenians. Socrates
is simply asserting himself as any other man or woman. In fact, he is speaking here of the singular’s
ontological status, of how every singular entity is caught in this abysmal economy. In fact, and this
again highlights the subtle imprecision in Foucault’s notion of the primacy of the other in Socrates’
practice, it is from this assumption of his mortality, of his position as a mortal singularity nurtured
and supplemented by both life and death, that he starts to speak also of his fellow Athenians, to spe-
cifically address other singular beings. It is from this exposition of the self, this questioning and lib-
erating of the self in the suspension of the self’s identity in life, that the question of the other is
opened, that the possibility of questioning the other becomes effective. So, the primary question for
Socrates is the question of the singular self’s life, from which the question of the other necessarily
follows. The dissolution of the singular identified as a substance moving from life to death, towards
the constitution of the singular as a naught, yet hybrid, suspended, radically ungrounded substance
freed from being reducible to any substantial determination, proves so consuming that it affects also
the relation the singular has to its others. Paradoxically, the type of relation serving as an example to
how intersubjectivity functions within this free-fall is the most substantial relation imaginable: the
familiar relation.
18. At the end of his speech, Socrates utters a last request before being sent off to his cell:
Still I have a favour to ask of [my condemners]. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my
friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to
care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they
are really nothing, –then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which
they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do
this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands. (41e-42a)
19. Now, the themes that are being explored in this passage are of importance for our reading. It
here becomes clear that Socrates is moving beyond simply claiming that he himself, he as a singu-
lar individual, is nothing, and that his speech is simply about affirming this, but rather, that others,
too, are nothing, and that he wants this to be known. And he is here not talking simply of any oth-
ers. Of all people, it is his sons that are here asked to be reminded of their own nothingness. How is
this to be read? There are, I believe, two aspects to this. First of all, Socrates is here redeploying a
summary of the main points of his speech in the form of a wisdom to be passed on to his sons. In
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line with his position as the philosopher questioning the epistemological and, in this case also ma-
terial, pretensions of his fellow Athenians through his method of dialectics, Socrates here repeats
the notion that the singular subject is a nothing, an empty void, that is incapable of furnishing the
ground for any such pretension to hold. This is not a denigration of subjectivity, but rather the as-
sumption of the singular’s radical finitude, which then opens up the possibility of a wise thinking il-
luminating “that for which [one] ought to care”, namely the finite margins and scope of one’s singu-
larity, which, in turn, opens up the freedom of its infinite indeterminacy. In facing this death, in fa-
cing its impossibility as such, the singular is reborn as an ungrounded, suspended, hybrid entity os-
cillating between its own determinations, between life and death, radically free in the abyss of its
own nothingness. But there is something more important in this passage: it marks the nothingness at
play in the relationship between the singular and those surrounding it, and, particularly, those deriv-
ing from it.
20. The way in which the familiar relation is here portrayed is not as a naturally grounded relation.
Socrates is here not trying to live on by requesting the judges to remind his sons of their father, or
by determining his sons as only being the descendants of an unjustly accused philosopher. He as-
sumes here his own teaching. Not even the most substantial relation imaginable is safe from the
abysmal  void  governing singularity.  Even the  parent-child  relationship  becomes  devoid  of  any
ground. His sons cannot definitively claim to be simply Socrates’ descendants, and neither can So-
crates definitively determine himself as a father, or his sons to be simply his descendants. The ‘pun-
ishment’ here is the annihilation of these identifying markers. But, as we have seen numerous times,
this ‘punishment’ is, in actuality, a blessing. The upshot of reducing his sons to a nothing, of consid-
ering them as a nothing, and of having them considered even by the law as a nothing, is that they
are, precisely, not reducible to this particular determination. If there is a contract between father and
son, it is not one that can indefinitely gather the sons under the reign of the father, just as much as
the sons cannot indefinitely define themselves as the offspring of their parents. Not only in the
sense that sons can become fathers too, or that they can take the role of the parent in their relation to
their own parents, as if this were just a matter of reversing positions. Socrates is here making an on-
tological point about the necessary ex-stasis that is required of both constitutive elements of the fa-
miliar relation. Both, in a sense, have to become a nothing again, both need to escape the particular
manifestation that was determined by the conception of the child, in order to return to their void and
mark themselves as authentic singularities, ready to define and determine themselves yet again as
other, different, less and therefore more than their natural origin.
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21. This is not to say that Socrates is here severing all types of relations, folding the singular back
into itself, to let it rest as a solipsistic whole with no ties to an outside. It rather marks a new kind of
relation, a relation not grounded in fixed, defining properties, or purely natural traits, but rather a re-
lation announcing a new kind of community, a community of singularities that are, precisely, noth-
ing as singularities and, in this shared un-ground, always already more than simply singular. It here
becomes impossible not to mention Jean-Luc Nancy and his seminal study Être singulier pluriel, in
which he thinks around this exact point in which the singular, as a numerical identity, is met with its
innermost impossibility and gives itself over to its deriving from the cum of the être-avec:
Singulier pluriel: en sorte que la singularité de chacun soit indissociable de son être-avec-plusieurs, et
parce que,  de fait, et en général, une singularité est indissociable d’une pluralité. Ici encore, il  ne
s’agit pas d’une propriété supplémentaire. Le concept du singulier implique sa singularisation et donc
sa distinction d’avec d’autres singularités […]. Au reste, singuli ne se dit en latin qu’au pluriel, parce
qu’il désigne l’«un» du «un par un». Le singulier, c’est d’emblée  chaque  un, et donc aussi chacun
avec et entre tous les autres. Le singulier est un pluriel.13
22. This new type of relation is one which is pre-ontological, a void swallowing all kinds of rela-
tions, in the sense that it establishes the bond before the being of the singular, or, to put it differ-
ently, before the void of the singular. The singular is always already in-relation-to: being is being-
with, falling is falling-with. Not in the sense of a naturally or socially grounded bond, but as a bond
that precedes even these particular manifestations of community. Not as a bond that forms a total-
ised relation, but as a bond that is “toujours indéfiniment à compléter”,14 an inexhaustible tie in
which multiple singularities come into a contactless contact and assume their groundless status as
singulier pluriel.
23. Socrates describes the familiar relation precisely in such a context, supplementing the nothing
of the singular by the more than one of the singular. It is not a relation determining the family as a
fixed communion, as a defining, contractual bond; or rather, it can only be such a relation if this re-
lation is inscribed into a more original ontological relation between abysmal singularities, multiple
nothings, which, as a voided relation, is not reducible to the strict familiar relation of parent-child.
Both constituents of the relation determine themselves as related, as more than one, but also as less
13 [Singular plural: in the sense that the singularity of each is indissociable from its being-with-many, and because, de
facto and in general, a singularity is indissociable from a plurality. Once again, this is not a matter of a supplementa-
ry property. The concept of the singular implies its singularisation and thus its distinction from other singularities
[…]. Besides,  singuli  can only be said in its plural form in Latin, because it designates the  “one” of the “ony by
one”. The singular is at once each one and thus also each one with and between all the others. The singular is a plu-
ral.] J-L.Nancy, Être Singulier Pluriel, 52.
14 [always to complete indefinitely] Ibid. 56.
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than one, as a void, a non-determinable, free-falling entity. They are preceded by a relationality as
such, inscribed into an ontology which becomes diktyo-abussology, a web or net of lacking singu-
larities, which are incessantly and restlessly related more originally than in birth, through life and
beyond death in an abysmal nexus turning nothing into plural nothing. This is not to say that, for
Socrates, we all wallow in the same, primordial abyss, as if it were all just a case of establishing yet
another shared ground or ontological origin; rather, each and all singular entity is  singularly less
than one, singularly deferred in its own inexhaustible void into which it, so to speak, falls, thus in-
cessantly impossibilising the defining mark of the particular determination of its relation towards
the other and the plural, whether it be familiar, social, political, amorous, or other. And it is in this
grounding of the natural, substantial relation in an un-ground, in this release, relief of the singular
into the original abysmal nexus and in its constitution as both singularly plural and substantially
nothing, that Socrates opens, announces, touches upon the notion of justice.  Let us quote the text
again:
…reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and
thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons
will have received justice at your hands. (42a)
Justice involves assuming this abysmal nexus, to situate oneself within it, and to see it also in effect
in the other.
24. Within this voided economy, this groundless ground on which every step is, perhaps, a mis-
step, one has to shiver in the face of turning this thought into a defining statement on the essence of
justice. However, we are here required to move forward, to try and think such a notion of justice, to
approach it with utmost care and to consider how we are to think it in the context of Socrates’ herit-
age.
Justice of the Singular
25. Why have I, so far, avoided facing the question of justice head-on in this text? Why have I,
every time it was mentioned, hinted at, touched upon by Socrates, sought to divert our reading to
other subtleties in the text, most notably to the position and constitution of the singular within the
context of the lack of knowledge, the transforming logic of the experience of death, and the desub-
stantialisation of the relation between multiple singularities? In a text entitled “Justice of the Singu-
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lar”, it might appear odd that one side of the story is purposefully left unexplored. However, if I
were here to defend myself, defend myself as Socrates did, I would follow his steps and proclaim
that I have done no wrong. On the contrary, there is nothing to suggest that, in treating the topic of
the singular, there was no reference to justice at all. In some sense, it is impossible to introduce
justice, with all its ties to, all the while being irrreducible to, ethics, the political, intersubjectivity,
decision, judgment, without also, or, first, talking about the singular, the particular, the one among
the many, perhaps even the one which can never be related to a universal, incessantly escaping uni-
versality. And it is here that I would like to mark that there is in the Apology a type of anticipation, a
type of retroactive echo of another text on the question of justice and its relation to the singular,
which has nurtured and haunted my reading of Socrates’ defence: Force de Loi by Jacques Derrida.
26. Socrates, as we have seen, launches his defence as an outsider, as the singular within the eth-
ical whole of Athens who speaks in a tongue deemed foreign before the law and seeks, through this
position of liminality, to engage the notion of justice precisely at that place where margins become
blurred, where the singular stands at the threshold, an impossible, undecidable threshold, between
being less than one, and more than one, not reducible to a singular manifestation, always less and
always more than a singular manifestation. There is a clear parallel here to the manner in which
Derrida begins his lecture entitled “Du droit à la justice”, which figures in Force de Loi: “C’est pour
moi un devoir, je dois m’adresser à vous en anglais”.15 The singularity of the speaker, of his or her
idiom, of the marginal foreigner being listened to and being asked to speak, is here, as in the Apo-
logy, inevitably weighed against the many, the universal, the possibility of being heard, understood,
assimilated, absorbable by and differentiable from the whole. The singular here meets its own lim-
its, standing at the point where it bows to the universal, the many, in assuming its language, all the
while being outside a clear identification with the universal for precisely the reason that the lan-
guage employed always remains singularly linked to a singular voice. It is this tension, this aporetic
situation in which the singular is facing the challenge, or the chance, of the universal, in which the
singular is never simply reducible to just a particular determination of the universal, all the while
having to face the supplement pushing it to, as of yet, unknown determinations, determinations that
are still to-come, that will always engage it in yet another relation to the universal, and in which the
universal is never simply reducible to an amalgamation of singularities, all the while being moved
towards constantly and incessantly reimagining itself as a universal with ties to the singular, it is
this tension that concretely touches upon that which one might call the question of justice. How is
15 [It is, for me, an obligation, I have to address you in English.] J. Derrida, Force de loi, 13.
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this to be understood? How are we to determine such a justice? How are we to think justice and the
singular together, with reference to both Socrates and Derrida?
27. In fact, the question of justice becomes indistinguishable from the very practice of questioning
that Socrates, and, as we will see shortly, also Derrida, engage in their liminal speech. It is almost as
if Socrates, in defending himself as a singularity, in reconsidering the singular as such, in reframing
the question of singularity and judgment, both of others and of oneself, had already tentatively ap-
proached the question of justice. Is there not the desire to portray himself justly before the judges, to
aim at a just portrayal of himself as a singular accused, to be just to himself and to give his sons a
just treatment? Is not all this inextricably tied to his very method of framing his speech, of address-
ing and undoing, as we have seen, the oppositional logic that finds him accused? Is it not echoed in
his desire to resuscitate, from the death of this logic, a wise logic wholly conscious of the unsteady
ground it treads, of the indeterminate abyss widening under its feet? It is almost as if, for Socrates,
the question of justice is not to be rushed towards a fixed answer, but should rather be patiently un-
grounded itself, engaged differently than just as the counter-weight of injustice, shaken until its dis-
solution, turned into an ungrounding of grounds, a  deconstruction  perhaps. Is there not a parallel
between Socrates’ ungrounding of pretensions, of his blurring and questioning of clear demarca-
tions between good and evil, the realm of the living and that of the dead, crime and order, and
Jacques Derrida’s “questionnement sur les fondements”?16 Would they not, in some sense, share a
voice, or perhaps a writing, if one imagined them being asked about their relation to the question of
justice? Socrates, who never retaliates, who never admits his guilt and stays loyal to his understand-
ing of the good, examined life, who does not bow to the instantiation of right he is subjected to and
rather subverts the order in which any such instantiation could be identified with justice, and who
sees justice precisely harboured within a logic that bursts all determinations of it by engaging it in
an incessant questioning which aims not at a definite answer, but rather at an endlessly echoing call
for a constant re-orientation of the singular and its relation to justice. Derrida, who is adamant about
the fact that justice is always already at work, although “de façon oblique”,17 in deconstruction, this
“questionnenemt  sur  les  fondements”,  which  is  “ni  fondationnaliste  ni  anti-fondationnaliste”,18
which even entertains the possibility of questioning “la possibilité ou l’ultime nécessité du question-
16 [questioning of foundations] Ibid. 22.
17 [in an oblique way] Ibid. 26.
18 [neither foundationalist nor anti-foundationalist] Ibid.
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nement même”,19 which questions the place from which a question is formulated, in order to suggest
the following:
Oblique comme en  ce  moment  même,  où je  m’apprête  à  démontrer  que l’on  ne  peut  pas  parler
directement de la justice, thématiser ou objectiver la justice, dire «ceci est juste» et encore moins «je
suis juste» sans trahir immédiatement la justice, sinon le droit.20
And yet, how are we to  think  and  determine  this practice of questioning as justice, if justice can
never be reduced to any such determination?
28. And here we touch upon the very heart of Derrida’s attempt to think around justice, to determ-
ine an undeterminable,  impossible  justice that, against all odds, demands to be incessantly faced.
There are three aporias that Derrida tentatively thinks in his text, and that we should quickly sum-
marise before continuing. The first revolves around the notion that the only just  decision is a de-
cision which does not simply follow a pre-established, calculated principle, but which  suspends
such a principle or law and singularly treats, or re-treats the matter at hand as an “acte d’interpréta-
tion réinstaurateur”,21 all the while still, in some sense, laying claim to a kind of universality. So:
Bref, pour qu’une décision soit juste et responsable, il faut que dans son moment propre, s’il y en a un,
elle soit à la fois réglée et sans règle, conservatrice de la loi et assez destructrice ou suspensive de la
loi pour devoir à chaque cas la réinventer, la re-justifier, la réinventer au moins dans la réaffirmation et
la confirmation nouvelle et libre de son principe.22
29. Undeterminably  both  principle  and  non-principle,  universal  and  absolutely  singular.  The
second aporia is related to the first, and treats that which links justice to the undecidable. What Der-
rida here marks as the true aporetic challenge of justice is not that deciding between two contradict-
ory but imperative options might seem impossible to calculate, but that the experience of undecid-
ability nevertheless calls for a decision that is conscious of both options at the same time:
L’indécidable n’est  pas  seulement  l’oscillation ou la tension entre deux décisions.  Indécidable est
l’expérience de ce qui, étranger, hétérogène à l’ordre du calculable et de la règle,  doit  cependant –
c’est de devoir qu’il faut parler – se livrer à la décision impossible en tenant compte du droit et de la
19 [the possibility or the ultimate necessity of the questioning itself] Ibid.
20 [Oblique, like in this very moment, where I am preparing to demonstrate that one cannot speak directly of justice,
thematise or objectify justice, say “this is just” and even less “I am just” without immediately betraying justice, if
not right.] Ibid. 26.
21 [a re-instituting interpretative act] Ibid. 50.
22 [In short, for a decision to be just and responsible, it is required that, in its proper moment, if there is one, it is at
once regulated and without a rule, that it conserves the law and sufficiently destroys and suspends the law to have to
reinvent it each time, to re-justify it, to reinvent it at least in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of
its principle.] Ibid. 51.
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règle. Une décision qui ne ferait pas l’épreuve de l’indécidable ne serait pas une décision libre, elle ne
serait que l’application programmable ou le déroulement continu d’un processus calculable. Elle serait
peut-être légale, mais elle ne serait pas juste. Mais dans le moment de suspens de l’indécidable, elle
n’est pas juste non plus, car seule une décision est juste.23
30. The third aporia follows from this. Justice, in all its irreducibility to a particular moment of it,
in its indefinite deferral, is not to be compared to an “avènement messianique”,24 or to an “idée
régulatrice kantienne”,25 that, situated in a rational subject, calls for an infinite approximation in our
practical attitude, but rather demands an immediate decision precisely at that moment where it is the
most radically undecidable. A decision without calculation, without prior regulation, contextualisa-
tion, “agissant dans la nuit du non-savoir et de la non-règle”,26 all the while acting as if it had the
chance of grounding some claim to universality. It is at this precise threshold, between a certain
void out of which one acts, an irreducible abyss, and the necessity for action, for determination, for
the hesitant formulation of a type of ‘principle’ which is stated, among other examples, as “la justice
incalculable commande de calculer”,27 “la déconstruction est la justice”,28 or, perhaps, as Socrates
said earlier, as an ethical obligation to fight injustice without regard to epistemology or the sweep-
ing oblivion of death, while also calling to “reprove those who think they are something when they
are really nothing, and they shall receive justice at your hand”, that we can, although hesitantly,
situate justice. A justice that, out of a ‘mad, infinite idea’, pushes and keeps pushing each and all de-
termination, whether it be political, ethical, social, philosophical, conceptual, epistemological, sub-
jective or intersubjective, out of the grave of its particular, singular manifestation into yet another
abyss, to suspend it there once more, until the coin stops spinning, waiting to be flicked and put in
motion again. If Socrates is condemned for pushing the question of epistemology into an indeterm-
inable abyss, for dislodging the singular from fixed determinations towards the transformative ex-
perience of death and its unrooting force, for blurring the margins that are so often considered as
definitively marking two sides of a relation of opposites, for engaging the inter-singular relation as
an unfinished relation not eternally defined by substantial origins, for raising the singular above and
23 [The undecidable is not only the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable is the experience of
that which, being strange, heterogenous to the order of the calculable and of the rule, nevertheless has to – it is of an
obligation that one has to speak here – give itself to the impossible decision while taking into account both the right
and the rule. A decision which would not take on the challenge of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it
would only be the programmatic application or the continuous execution of a calculable process. It would perhaps
be legal, but it would not be just. But in the moment of suspense of the undedicable, it is also not just, because only
a decision is just.] Ibid. 53
24 [messianic advent] Ibid. 57.
25 [a Kantian regulatory idea] Ibid.
26 [acting in the night of non-knowledge and of the non-rule] Ibid. 58.
27 [the incalculable justice demands calculation] Ibid. 61.
28 [deconstruction is justice] Ibid. 35.
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beyond its pure self-relation towards an openness, interrelatedness, hybridity and plurality when it
comes to the discussion of epistemological questions, the self, and the relation to family, friends,
enemies, the state, the law, etc., then, speaking here with both Socrates and Derrida, this condemna-
tion is, perhaps, not just. Not just in that, in fixing Socrates as the singular outside the whole, in re-
pressing the frantic negative constantly questioning the particular conception of right that finds him
accused, in simply following and applying their laws, the Athenian court is missing a justice that
can never be reducible to this particular manifestation, that does not nurture itself from the logic
that  finds  Socrates  accused,  that  rather  goes  above  and  beyond,  perhaps  even  radically  and
abysmally below this logic by constantly putting it under the knife of the question.
31. However, this is not to say that Socrates, in being among the first to walk this abyss of justice,
has already solved or absolutised the question of justice, as if all we had to do now was to repeat his
steps, utter his words; as if he were now our ground on which we could stand, or the father to whom
we could forever listen. He might have opened the question of justice towards another direction and
realm than that of pure right, legality, the “either…or…”, but, as Derrida has quite clearly shown,
any singular defence inevitably ends up as a decision that again fixates justice as yet another prin-
ciple,  a  calculation  of  the  incalculable.  We all  know that  Socrates  ends  up  drinking  from the
poisoned chalice and that it is  his decision to do so, as can be read from his refusal to take up
Crito’s offer to help him flee Athens and his sentence. Socrates would rather die in concordance
with the Athenian divine laws, than to break any laws. His opening of the question of justice, his re-
configuration of the singular and formulation of an abysmal thinking, ends with the decision to
grant accordance to that conception of right which closes each and all such abysmal definition of
justice. His decision is not just. Yet, as a decision, it nevertheless is. The crucial point here is that,
whatever he would have chosen, the outcome itself could not have been just. Both Socrates and Der-
rida, in their thinking about what justice could be, push it towards a kind of radically other, radically
open, ungrounded, unfixable, abysmal idea which, as both Joseph Cohen and Raphael Zagury-Orly
assert, “one cannot but betray”.25 In fixing the unfixable, grounding the ungroundable, determining
the undeterminable, Socrates  of course, misses his own mark. But, as so often established in this
text, this failure, is, perhaps, the true failed success. In leading the Athenian notion of law as justice
towards enacting a sacrifice of the singular accused to reestablish a unity, in bowing to the attempt
to silence the idea of a justice, of a thinking, a wisdom that is other than that of grounds and found-
25 For a similar reading of the relation between a Derridean justice and the political, in which the political, in its pursuit
of justice, incessantly betrays justice, cannot but betray it, see J. Cohen, R. Zagury-Orly, “Standing at the Limits of
the Political”, Derrida-Levinas, 132-33.
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ations, other than that of a martial law so certain of its rectitude and justness, Socrates might have
momentarily revealed the backside of each landed coin, this  other logic, which constantly and in-
cessantly attempts to break up the founding of grounds in order to provoke yet another fall. Herein
lies his singular justice, his singularly just decision, and his justice as a singularity which halts and
turns otherwise the economy of crime and punishment, particular and universal, freedom and de-
termination. The echo of this infinite call for justice engulfing each and all singular manifestation
and decision in the void of the abyss, in the indeterminacy between nothing and something, one and
many, life and death, knowledge and non-knowledge, father and son, and which, in escaping all at-
tempts to formulate a principle or universal law, still entertains the always impossible possibility of
such a formulation, has been resonating ever since. Socrates’ singular defence has launched this
practice, this just practice of questioning, this unwillingness to settle for simple answers and defin-
ite conclusions, this pushing forward towards the aporia, this passing through the threshold of the
undecidable into yet another undecidable, unlocatable place. His place in the void was unoccupied
after his death, it was taken up by Derrida, and now beckons us to step forth and jump. Each singu-
lar entity, related through this calling to keep the coin in motion, to keep justice in motion, is tasked
with leaping into the abyss of the aporetic, to become and keep becoming both less and more than
what it could ever settle for. Justice awaits the singular in the expanses of the void, at the margins of
its (im)possibility, at the aporetic threshold calling for action; this liminal place, where the question
gives itself over to the act of betrayal, where the act of betrayal gives birth to yet another question.
Works Cited
COHEN, JOSEPH. Le Sacrifice de Hegel. Paris: Galilée, 2007.
COHEN, JOSEPH, ZAGURY-ORLY, RAPHAEL. “Standing at the Limits of the Political”.  Derrida-Levinas:
An Alliance Awaiting the Political. Eds. Orietta Ombrosi, Raphael Zagury-Orly. Mimesis Inter-
national, year. 117-152.
DERRIDA, JACQUES. Force de loi. Paris: Galilée, 2005.
DERRIDA, JACQUES. Séminaire La peine de mort : Volume 1 (1999-2000). Paris: Galilée, 2012.
FOUCAULT,  MICHEL.  “L’éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la  liberté”.  Foucault:  Dits  et
écrits, 1976-1988. Ed. Daniel Defert, François Ewald. Paris: Gallimard, 2001. 1527-48.
88
L’Atelier 12.1 (2020) Le Singulier
HARMAN, GRAHAM. Object-Oriented Ontology: A New Theory of Everything. London: Pelican Books,
2018.
HEGEL, G.W.F. The Science of Logic. Trans. George Di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010.
HUI, YUK.  The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics. Falmouth:
Urbanomic, 2016.
LEVINAS, EMMANUEL. “Mourir Pour…”. Entre Nous. Paris: Grasset, 1991. 204-14.
PLATO. “Apology”. The Dialogues of Plato Vol. 1. Ed. and Transl. by Benjamin Jowett. London: Ox-
ford University Press, 1953. 341-66.
NANCY, JEAN-LUC. Être Singulier Pluriel. Paris: Galilée, 2013.
STEYERL, HITO. “In Free Fall: A Thought Experiment on Vertical Perspective”. The Wretched of the
Screen. Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012. 12-31.
ŽIŽEK,  SLAVOJ. Less  than  Nothing:  Hegel  and  the  Shadow of  Dialectical  Materialism. London:
Verso, 2012.
89
